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Soviet and American Behavior During the Yom Kippur War

AMERICAN ARMED FORCES went on a Condition 3 precautionary alert October 25, 1973, during the Yom Kippur War. President Nixon described the crisis as the most difficult since the Cuban missile confrontation. Secretary of State Kissinger saw a "three out of four chance" of Soviet troop intervention in the Middle East and promised to discuss the alert within the week. He never did, leaving opinion divided between those who found it a classic example of military force used to deter Soviet aggression and those who called it an overreaction. Kissinger tried to have it both ways by referring to the alert as "our *deliberate* overreaction." Except for the Kalbs, no one has carefully examined this first test of detente. It is widely believed that detente set limits on the Middle East problem,¹ but a close look at events indicates that detente had little effect on Soviet behavior or on the outcome of the crisis: the Middle East problem set limits on detente.

An observer of Soviet activity in the Middle East who believes military demonstrations deter aggression has divided the Politburo into adventurists and those who condemn excessive risks. He contends that positions shift among Politburo members, but once a faction proposes involvement abroad, another group condemns the initiative as dangerous in order to gain if events go badly. A 5-10 percent chance of American intervention is prohibitively high for the Soviets.² Of course, judging a 5-10 percent risk in foreign affairs is impossible and an extreme example of imputing continuity to unique, unrelated, and often irrational acts. The DefCon 3 (Defense Condition 3) alert offers the opportunity to examine crisis management in Washington and Moscow and to test the influence of force on Soviet activity.

A Condition 3 alert is not an irreversible nor, arguably, even a dramatic move up the nuclear ladder. Alerts run from 1 to 5. DefCon 1 deploys troops for combat, DefCon 2 readies troops for combat, and 3 places forces on stand-by awaiting further orders. Condition 4 is the normal peace-time deployment of troops being trained. With DefCon 5 recruits lack training and forces are not in any state of readiness. In January, 1968, 15,000 Air Force and Naval reservists were put on active duty after North Koreans captured the *Pueblo*. President Kennedy called up 14,000 Air Force reservists during the missile crisis in October, 1962, and activated 150,000 reservists with Soviet pressure on Berlin in 1961. The last Condition 3 alert followed the assassination of President Kennedy, though the Nixon administration called a selective DefCon 3 alert during the September, 1970, crisis in Jordan and Syria.

The Soviets probably had difficulty figuring out American intentions during the alert of October 25. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) operates on DefCon 4; the Pacific Command is normally on DefCon 3. Polaris submarines shift between phases 2 and 3. The 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean remained on DefCon 2 during the crisis. SAC moved bombers into take-off positions, and some crews sat in their planes for brief periods. Security was tightened at airports and missile bases. Fifty to sixty B-52s flew from Guam to the United States for reasons which remain unclear. SAC tankers to refuel the bombers did not shift north from the mid-Atlantic to facilitate non-stop flights to Europe and the Middle East. The 15,000-man 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, a "quick-reaction force," was told to prepare for deployment by 6 A.M., October 25, and the Alaska and Panama Commands were alerted. Two airborne battalions in West Germany went on stand-by. The Pentagon prepared to fly troops to the Middle East, but cancelled the plan within six hours of the alert. The carrier *J. F. Kennedy* was ordered at 1:30 A.M. from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. It joined the *Saratoga*, the *Independence*, and two helicopter carriers already there, the *Iwo Jima* and the *Guadalcanal*, each with contingents of 2,000 assault troops. The Texas Air National Guard and the 107th Fighter Interceptor Group at Niagara Falls were activated, as well as units throughout the world. The Coast Guard was brought into the alert twelve hours after it began.

Prelude to War

Prior to the Yom Kippur War, Secretary of State Kissinger had not been particularly concerned or informed about the Middle East. While national security advisor, he had left negotiations to Secretary of State Rogers and Assistant Secretary Joseph Sisco. The 1969-71 Rogers Plan to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in exchange for recognition of Israel's existence and security had failed. Kissinger found opportunities for diplomatic success few, the conflict stubborn, and little to be done. He had concentrated on Vietnam and detente; American interest in the Middle East was "episodic."³ Comments to Arab leaders that he only entered negotiations when the situation was "hot" or on the eve of a breakthrough ("If Israel accepts them [6 points for cease-fire and negotiations], we'll call it the 'Kissinger Plan'. If Israel rejects them,

then it's the 'Sisco Plan'.⁴) reenforced a popular negative image of the secretary. Kissinger used such comments and his personal involvement to persuade leaders that diplomatic movement was likely and to increase his own chances of success. When events did not move, he spoke as he had about detente, that the situation was a process, not a condition, and improvements would come gradually. The desired condition was always coming, never attained. He repeated to both Arabs and Israelis that it had taken him four years to resolve Vietnam, 2½ years to get to Peking; they could not expect spectacular success right away.⁵

Middle East events took Washington by surprise in 1973. The CIA had provided Kissinger evidence of a buildup along the Egyptian and Syrian fronts during September and October, but he apparently took the buildup for a bluff, maneuvers, or an Arab attempt to establish a new equilibrium in the Middle East. The Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency published a report from Beirut October 2 that Arab operations against Israel were imminent. The same day the Middle East News Agency announced that the Egyptian 2nd and 3rd Corps had been put on alert. The Soviets withdrew hundreds of civilians from Egypt and Syria just before the war. The evacuation so grossly betrayed the attack that some observers have contended the Soviets did it to signal Washington in time to avert a major conflict. Moscow launched an unusual number of spy satellites, eight in all October 2, a ninth October 3, and a tenth October 6. Washington missed all these signals.⁶

Kissinger had become secretary of state one week before the war began. He may have thought the Soviets were running things and they would not embarrass him as the architect of detente, at least not so soon. American intelligence had another spectacular miss: Kissinger had first learned from news dispatches of the expulsion of 15,000-20,000 Soviet advisors from Egypt in July, 1972.⁷ The secretary may have doubted CIA reliability and been so impressed by Israeli military performance and confidence, he did not expect an Arab attack. Israel had air superiority, and discussions were planned promising a political settlement. As it was, Tel Aviv received information at 4 A.M., October 6, that the battle would begin at 6 P.M. (Israeli time). Prime Minister Golda Meir warned Syria and Egypt not to attack and told Washington it would not launch a first strike. Kissinger assured the Soviets and the Egyptian ambassador at the United Nations that Israel would not attack first and urged them to avert conflict. The Arabs moved their attack forward to 2 P.M. Tel Aviv did not mobilize the reserves or alert its defenses in the ten-hour interval.⁸ Kissinger had not conferred with the CIA or State Department intelligence before the alert. No formal national intelligence estimate was written on the Arab-Israeli situation after May 17, and no Soviet analysts or specialists outside Kissinger's personal staff were consulted during the crisis.⁹ President Nixon received a CIA report October 5 judging a war possible, but improbable.¹⁰

Accounts of Kissinger during the Yom Kippur War and truce have lauded his brilliant management of events and negotiating skills. They have perpetuated the "Super K" image of biographies and articles primarily concerned whether he was Metternich,

Talleyrand, Bismarck, Machiavelli, Castlereagh, or the Lonesome Cowboy.¹¹ Several studies have described Kissinger as wanting a military stalemate to avoid a political stalemate. Another Israeli victory would have to be avenged by the Arabs, and Tel Aviv would refuse to relinquish territories captured during the 1967 War. To achieve this stalemate, the secretary limited arms aid to prevent a decisive Israeli victory. In this version of events, Kissinger told the Israeli ambassador in Washington Simcha Dinitz that arms were slow coming because of “bureaucratic obstructionism” at the Pentagon. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and then Deputy Secretary William Clements, a Texan with oil interests, were holding things up. Schlesinger promised Israel 1½ Phantoms per day to a limit of 16 at a time Tel Aviv had lost 1/5 of its air force (60+ jets). Kissinger told Dinitz that Israel had to arrange to transport arms by civilian airliners, and that Portugal was delaying the airlift by withholding permission to refuel planes in the Azores.¹² Schlesinger later remarked that the Pentagon delays were part of a cover story to protect “the realities of national policy.”¹³ They were to give Kissinger time to evaluate the Soviet response and Israeli needs. Meanwhile, lesser officials at the Pentagon confidently told reports Israel would win the war, but only after a protracted and costly engagement.¹⁴

The Soviet airlift to Egypt substantially increased October 7, the second day of the war. The administration would eventually learn that most of the Antonov-12s flying to Cairo were only half full of arms. Soviet equipment came from Russian and Warsaw Pact stocks, indicating no long-range preparations for an attack.¹⁵ On the basis of numbers of Soviet planes, Washington began a major airlift October 12. President Nixon was said to have “exploded” when he found out about the previous delays in arms to Israel. Dispatch of 10 Phantoms and 20 C-130s was still held up for hours, and most of the C-130s flew half-loaded.¹⁶ An airlift of large C-5As and C-141s began October 13 and ended November 14, with the exception of two flights. Fifty-one C-5As and 177 C-141s delivered 22,497 tons of materiel to Israel, though only 39 percent arrived before the cease-fire of October 24. While there were enough C-5As to accomplish the mission, an average of 60 percent (46 planes) assigned to the Military Airlift Command were inoperable each day: 22 percent in depot maintenance, 25 percent in unit maintenance, and 13 percent lacking spare parts. Thirty-five percent of the C-141s were inoperable for the same reasons. The lack of spare parts for C-5As partly resulted from their recent development. Many systems and subsystems were likely to be replaced or modified. To avoid a sizable investment in spare parts with such a high failure rate that the systems would eventually be replaced, the parts were not obtained.¹⁷ To further complicate supply efforts, Israeli secrecy had prevented Washington from developing a contingency plan for arms aid during a crisis. The Pentagon had to deplete its stocks in Europe.¹⁸

The Yom Kippur War

Five Egyptian divisions (75,000 men) and 600 tanks hit the Bar-Lev Line at three points October 6. Egyptian tanks attacked bunkers along the Line, but did not lead

forces into the Sinai. Tanks advanced to prepared hull-down positions and fired across the Canal at Israeli targets from less than 400 meters in some cases. The Israelis had built a moraine of sand on the East Bank of the Canal, and their tanks could not observe enough of the fighting to hinder the crossing. Small groups of Egyptian infantry with *Sagger* and RPG-7 anti-tank missiles appeared at the top of the moraine and fired at the tanks below. Israeli armor charged erratically, and more than 150 tanks were temporarily lost in early skirmishes. Egyptian tanks were used in support until October 14, when they attacked in three uncoordinated columns preceding infantry. Israeli tank companies engaged each column from hull-down positions with mass sniping. The Israelis learned to move their vehicles out of the line of sight of the *Sagger* gunner controller. The *Sagger* took at least ten seconds to reach its target after the rocket appeared in the sky. The gunner-controller had to guide the missile from directly behind its line of flight, and the Israelis concentrated machine gun fire on likely positions.

Syrian armor moved into the Golan Heights in two closely packed columns on October 6, down the Damascus Road and along the Trans-Arabian pipeline. Russian advisors were said to have commented that the Syrians took everything from them except advice. Tanks advanced along relatively narrow fronts in combined arms columns instead of following the Soviet tactic of advancing along a broader front. Within two days both Syrian columns had stalled.¹⁹

Egypt succeeded in crossing the Canal using Soviet assault bridging techniques and defensive tactics against armor and aircraft. It failed in Soviet-influenced heliborne operations. Otherwise, Israeli operations with their mobility, flanking attacks and envelopments, and speed of execution more closely resembled Soviet doctrine.²⁰

After their initial assault, the Egyptians did not move to capture the Mitla, Giddi, or Khatmia Passes to cut off Israeli supplies. General Ahmed Ismail, minister of defense and commander in chief of the armed forces, remarked later that the mobile anti-aircraft umbrella moved too slowly to protect any assault on the Passes.²¹ As it was, SAMs and anti-aircraft had limited success. Only 120 Israeli planes were shot down in 18,000 sorties.²²

The Israelis gradually recovered at a high cost of men and equipment. They counter-attacked across the Canal with 10,000 troops October 15. This *démarche* split the Egyptian 2nd from the 3rd Corps, separated the 3rd Corps from its logistical support, and slowly surrounded it. Between 15,000 and 30,000 troops were caught on the East Bank of the Canal in an area five miles wide and thirty miles long running to the southern tip of Bitter Lakes.

It is uncertain how soon Moscow realized what was happening, but the Kremlin announced October 15 the USSR would "assist in every way" the Arab effort to recapture territory lost in 1967. Premier Kosygin flew to Cairo for meetings October 16-19.

Nixon and Kissinger did not blame the Soviets. The war was the first major test of detente; that policy could still be their greatest achievement or greatest flop. Kissinger warned October 8 and 12 that detente could not survive irresponsibility in the Middle East, after which he or subordinates denied the warning was for Moscow. The Soviet

Union had not helped, but could not be judged “irresponsible.”²³ Postponing a confrontation while communicating American concern supposedly justified undercutting his own warnings. If the Soviet resupply were moderate, Washington would not heavily rearm Israel or blame Moscow. It was up to the Soviets.

The trouble with this strategy was that Moscow had strengthened Arab forces prior to the war. Even more importantly, one might not want to leave things up to the Soviets. Western arms had bested Russian arms during the Six-Day War in 1967. As a result, Moscow decided to provide the Arabs sophisticated, modern weapons.²⁴ It had given them SA-6 and SA-7 Strela surface-to-air missiles, the swing-wing SU-17 fighter, and the SCUD surface-to-surface missile operated by Soviet crews. The missile could carry a nuclear payload and reach Israel. Three SCUD missiles with conventional warheads were fired October 22, but all three missed their targets. Early in the fighting Moscow sent the MiG-17, MiG-21, and SU-7, but withheld the MiG-23 and MiG-25.²⁵ The USSR had sent the Arabs 1,000 tanks the month before the war.²⁶

Surprisingly, after Kosygin returned from Cairo no ships left the Soviet Union for Middle East ports. On October 22 the airlift dramatically diminished from nearly seventy to a half dozen flights. There were no flights October 23.²⁷

Some observers claimed that the Arabs already had enough equipment by October 20. At that point, the 3rd Corps was trapped, and Arab casualties were running four times higher than Israeli, totaling almost 2,000 tanks and 400 planes. Arab losses of Soviet tanks and fighters during the war equalled the front-line strengths of the combined nations of Western Europe.²⁸ On October 19 President Nixon requested a \$2.2 billion military assistance package for Israel (\$300 million in credits had already been extended, \$1.5 billion would eventually be designated a grant). Congress wanted to cut \$500 million. Kissinger argued that he had already committed the sum and the arms were already spent. Were Congress to reduce the \$2.2 billion, Nixon would make another request, and Congress, not the president, would be responsible for Arab outrage all over again.²⁹ At any rate, the Arabs desperately needed Soviet equipment, and at that moment, Moscow was not prepared to offer a *carte blanche*.

Soviet-Arab relations had been rough and smooth; Soviet-Egyptian relations were more often rough. The Arabs had cracked down on domestic Communists, at least talked about Arab unity, which Moscow opposed, and complained about Soviet stinginess, equipment, and poor treatment. For all the Soviet assistance, the Arab states had been overwhelmed by Israel in 1956 and 1967. The Arabs were inept fighters and “contentious tenants” in the Soviet household.³⁰ Estimates of Cairo’s indebtedness to Moscow at the time ranged as high as \$7 billion. Confidence was so low in the Egyptians, Moscow had put military assistance on a cash basis. Following the October War, the oil-rich states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Algeria) agreed to pay part of the Egyptian debt, and subsequently received the greatest share of Arab arms from the USSR.³¹ The Soviets were clearly unhappy about Egyptian performance. Brezhnev was supposed to have dressed down an Egyptian official, saying the Arabs were “incapable of killing

even a donkey.” By the time Kosygin arrived in Cairo, it looked as if the Soviet clients were losing again.

The American airlift to Lod Airport immediately challenged Soviet supply efforts. It reached 700 tons a day within three days. The Russians flew 930 missions an average of 1,700 miles for forty days delivering 15,000 tons of cargo. The United States flew 566 missions an average distance of 6,450 miles in thirty-two days for a total of 22,395 tons. Even Israeli commercial ElAl-747s with everything hand-loaded through passenger doors for eight to ten hours per plane accounted for 140 missions and more ton-miles than the USSR (34.3 to 25.5), though less tonnage (5,500 to 15,000). Total Israeli airlift-sealift resupply was 85,108 tons.³² The American sealift to Israel was about 27,000 tons, and the Soviet merchant marine brought approximately 80,000 tons of military supplies. Israeli and American tonnage exceeded Soviet supplies by about 40,000 tons (135,000 to 95,000). One analyst has suggested that these Soviet arms had a limited impact on events despite the high tonnage, but that the SAMs, alone, sent the Syrians October 10 made a significant difference.³³ While Moscow had only a rough idea of the American arms to Israel, as early as Kosygin’s visit to Cairo, Kremlin leaders faced another major defeat and a formidable arms commitment by Washington.

Energy Advisor to the President John A. Love stated October 9 that Middle East fighting would not interrupt oil production.³⁴ Arabs had repeatedly warned Washington that support for Israel would provoke an oil embargo. The president decided they were bluffing. Four Arab ministers visited Kissinger October 17 to protest the American airlift. The day after President Nixon formally requested \$2.2 billion in aid for Israel, Saudia Arabia announced a boycott of oil to the United States and the Netherlands, followed by a 5 percent reduction in crude-oil production every month until Israel withdrew to 1967 pre-war boundaries. Dependent on the Middle East for 70-80 percent of its oil, most European countries refused to help Israel—went “boneless,” in the words of a State Department official.³⁵ West Germany cooperated with Washington and Tel Aviv at first, then demanded that the transfer of American equipment from bases in Germany to Israel cease. Spain, Greece, and Turkey refused to let American aircraft land to refuel. Italy did the same, and Turkey permitted Soviet overflights. Yugoslavia allowed Russian planes to use airbases and vessels to stop at Rijeka in their sealift to the Middle East. France continued to support Arab states, though it had sold *Mirages* to both sides, with the consequence that Egypt and Israel downed some of their own jets. Nixon said the British were asked for permission to land at Akrotiri Airbase on Cyprus. British spokesmen maintained no request had been made. In the words of the *Economist*, Europe had shut its eyes, then run in circles when the crisis did not go away. It was the behavior of the “the ostrich and the hen.”³⁶

Negotiating a Cease-Fire Agreement

With both powers losing control of events, Ambassador Dobrynin gave Kissinger an invitation from Brezhnev at 10:00 A.M. October 19 to come to Moscow for conversa-

tions October 20-21. Talks began less than two hours after Kissinger arrived and lasted four hours. Brezhnev demanded a cease-fire and an Israeli withdrawal to the borders of 4 June 1967. At first he called for an immediate withdrawal, then asked for a withdrawal without a timetable. Kissinger wanted a cease-fire in place and linked United Nations Resolution 242 (the Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories) to negotiations. The second day Brezhnev agreed that negotiations would precede withdrawal. There has been speculation that Brezhnev and Kissinger promised not to increase aid to their allies, though Kissinger denied this explanation for the interruption in Soviet supplies to Egypt.

Kissinger flew from Moscow to Tel Aviv to convince the Israelis to accept the cease-fire terms. Foreign Minister Abba Eban asked Kissinger why he had not consulted with Tel Aviv before accepting Soviet conditions. Eban felt the military situation favored Israel and a cease-fire in place should have been accompanied by Arab concessions. The secretary replied that the Russians were jamming communications from the American Embassy and his plane: "Whoever conducts negotiations in Moscow has to pay a price."³⁷ At least, he later claimed, the Moscow trip had given Israel an extra ninety-six hours to consolidate its position on the battlefield.³⁸ Moshe Dayan reportedly said Washington provided evidence of impending Soviet intervention and would not stand in the way of an invasion if Tel Aviv ignored the cease-fire.³⁹ Nixon subsequently commented the State Department did not directly threaten Israel, but simply "made an offer it couldn't refuse."⁴⁰

Most accounts of the war have portrayed the Soviets eager for a cease-fire. Ambassador Vladimir Vinogradov was reported to have proposed a cease-fire to Sadat October 6. The Soviets repeated the request the next day, on October 10, and during the Cairo meetings October 16-19. Observers have taken these reports at face value. On October 6 and 7, Moscow would have been asking the Egyptians to withdraw from territory lost in 1967, while they were still advancing. If Moscow were prepared to do this, why had it rushed modern weapons to the Arabs earlier in the year, and why had it begun a major airlift October 7? The Soviets would have undermined Arab successes and their own influence in the Middle East with such proposals. Shipments of equipment increased significantly October 17, then dropped precipitously the next day. If Kosygin wanted a cease-fire, why had shipments risen?

Generally, the USSR had greatest influence during a "no-war, no-peace" situation. Events would remain tense, but manageable, and the Arabs would need Soviet arms. Once the war had started, however, Moscow was willing to see how things went. If Egypt were successful, Moscow could share the credit. If it were not, Moscow could trade arms for increased political influence. The Russians had to convince Sadat they were indispensable to provide the arms for military victory or indispensable to exert the diplomatic pressure to obtain a cease-fire. Moscow manipulated arms deliveries to impress Sadat with the fact its assistance was necessary whatever the outcome—cease-fire or military victory. It was later in the interest of the Soviets to appear to have favored a cessation of hostilities as a guarantor of detente. It was in the interest of

Sadat to have exaggerated Soviet pressure for a cease-fire to fit his image of seduction and betrayal by the Russians, and his own successful resistance to their demands.

Kosygin was in no position to offer Cairo a cease-fire. Brezhnev could not be certain Washington would support any proposal until he talked with Kissinger a few days later. Sadat did not have to be convinced of the advantages of a cease-fire. He had made his point about Egyptian bravery and Israeli vulnerability, and every day the war continued, that point was weakened. Kosygin was not in Cairo to learn about Egyptian military needs. Marshal Grechko or Admiral Gorshkov, who had been to Egypt on such missions and favored Soviet involvement, would have more suitably and symbolically represented Russian interests and determination. Supply during the crisis could have been arranged in a day. A two-day meeting was reasonable, three or four days indicated difficulties. The premier probably told Sadat that the USSR was not anxious to provide more arms as the situation deteriorated. He may have asked for air bases, a major Soviet role in any peace conference on the Middle East, and political concessions lost in 1972. The two leaders met once October 16, did not see each other October 17, and met at least five times October 18. Things went badly and the Soviets substantially cut military aid.

Kosygin traveled to Damascus October 21. There he neglected to tell President Assad that the Soviets would support Resolution 338—a cease-fire, Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories, and negotiations. Assad said the support was a total surprise and “was contrary to our course and to the picture we had in mind.” He accepted the course after Sadat told him the USSR had guaranteed a complete Israeli withdrawal from captured territories.⁴¹ Kissinger had not agreed to a complete withdrawal. Certainly, the Israelis would not accept it, the Soviets could not guarantee it, and Assad could hardly have believed in either possibility.⁴² Had Kosygin wished to clarify the Egyptian position to Kissinger, he would have attended the October 20 meeting. He was in Moscow that day. Instead he had represented the Soviet position in Cairo, and was not particularly interested in Sadat’s views or demands. The premier flew to Damascus rather than see Kissinger.

Soviet- and American-sponsored United Nations Resolution 338 passed and went into effect October 23. The Egyptians attempted to break out of the pincer, an unlikely move if the Soviets had guaranteed a cease-fire, and the Israelis struck more deeply into their lines. They came within fifty miles of Cairo and trapped the 3rd Corps by taking Suez City and driving toward the port of Adabiya. Kissinger reportedly called Dinitz and told him, “You want the Third Army? We won’t go to a Third World War for you.”⁴³ Nevertheless, the 3rd Corps had to be surrounded for Tel Aviv and Washington to have any diplomatic leverage during negotiations, or in fact, to insure there would be negotiations. Soviet UN Ambassador Yakov Malik demanded Israel return to the cease-fire lines of Monday, October 23, during a Tuesday session of the Security Council. No one was certain where the lines ran. The Chinese Ambassador Chiao Kuan-hua attacked the superpowers for the “malicious practice” of using the Security Council for their own ends. Malik and Chiao interrupted proceedings for

ten minutes while they shouted and waved their arms at each other, but China did not veto the Resolution.⁴⁴ The cease-fire went into effect October 24 with minor violations.

The Calling of the Alert

Soviet Ambassador in Washington Anatolii Dobrynin called on Kissinger at the State Department at 4:15 P.M., October 24, to discuss details of the cease-fire and impending negotiations. At 3 P.M. Sadat had asked over Cairo radio for a joint Soviet-American force to police the truce. The secretary told Dobrynin that the United States opposed a joint force. The ambassador replied that Malik had no instructions at the Security Council, as far as he knew. At 7:05 P.M. Dobrynin called to tell Kissinger that Malik did have instructions to support a nonaligned-nation proposal for a joint force. Kissinger phoned Dobrynin at 7:25 P.M. and was informed that the USSR might not wait for the proposal, but introduce its own resolution. At 8 P.M. Dobrynin may have passed on another proposal from Brezhnev for a joint force, but accounts disagree as to whether this occurred. At 9:25 P.M. (10:30 in Kissinger's memory) the ambassador called with a "very urgent" message from Brezhnev. The four-paragraph note warned that Moscow was prepared to send troops to the area alone if the United States refused to participate in the police action. Brezhnev said it was the responsibility of the powers in the era of detente to preserve peace in the Middle East.⁴⁵

The message began "Mr. President" instead of the usual "My Dear Mr. President." It accused Israel of violating the cease-fire, and urged a joint expedition without delay. "I will say it straight," Brezhnev warned, "that if you find it impossible to act together with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. Israel cannot be allowed to get away with the violations."⁴⁶ Senator Henry Jackson characterized the note as an insult, "brutal, rough," though he had not seen the text.⁴⁷ The administration did not release the message to mobilize support for the DefCon 3 alert which followed. It either decided release would violate diplomatic etiquette, even though the threat provoked a nuclear alert, or the American people would not understand to what degree they had been insulted.⁴⁸ While Tsar Nicholas I had offended Napoleon III by addressing him "Dear Cousin" instead of "My Dear Brother," this slight, in the jargon of the administration, would neither "fly" nor "float."

Despite nearly a quarter century of American political support for Israel and billions in military and economic assistance, a surprisingly large portion of the public did not back Tel Aviv during the first days of the war. A Gallup Poll released October 15 found 47 percent supported Israel, 6 percent favored the Arabs, 22 percent backed neither side, and 25 percent had no opinion.⁴⁹

The order of actions by Moscow—support of a nonaligned-nation resolution for joint action, readiness to introduce its own proposal shortly afterwards, then abandonment of the United Nations apparatus two hours later—may have represented a strategy to increase the pressure on Washington. More likely, Sadat had called for

the joint force without consulting Brezhnev, and Moscow reacted with extreme shifts in its position. After the United States had stated it had no intention of sending troops October 24, the Egyptians seemed to weaken their demands. Later in the evening, Mohammed Zayyat, the Egyptian foreign minister, requested that the powers act to restore the cease-fire lines. This did not require foreign troops, but diplomatic pressure. When Sadat asked for joint troop intervention, Egypt was facing military disaster. The 3rd Corps was surrounded and the Israeli Army was deployed one hour from Cairo. Sadat immediately mobilized the People's Militia for the first time since 1956 and requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council. Nasser had used the same strategy in 1967 when he closed the Strait of Tiran to the Gulf of Aqaba. He mistakenly expected the superpowers to intervene after this bold act to prevent escalation to war. Whether or not Egypt kept the Strait, he had achieved Arab unity and hero status.⁵⁰ Following "deep penetration" raids into the Nile Delta and suburbs of Cairo in 1970 by Israeli fighters, Nasser went to Moscow for arms, and when rebuffed, called once again for joint intervention by the powers.⁵¹ In that situation, Israel was certain to be restrained. Sadat, in another moment of desperation, did the same.

At the White House, Kissinger gathered three groups of Soviet, Arab, and United Nations experts to evaluate the text of the Brezhnev dispatch. An "abbreviated" emergency National Security Council meeting was called for 11 P.M. Only select members of the Council were present: Kissinger, Schlesinger, CIA Director Colby, Admiral Thomas Moorer, General Alexander Haig, and General Herbert Scowcroft—in the words of an NSC aide, "Kissinger, Kissinger and Schlesinger." Colby had not been told about Brezhnev's threat to intervene. The group met in the Situation Room in the basement of the White House. The vice-president normally attends NSC meetings, but Spiro Agnew had recently resigned and been fined for tax evasion. The president chairs the NSC, but Nixon remained in his living quarters that evening. The secretary of the treasury was absent. The director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness had retired fourteen months before, and no one represented that office. In any case, the decision to take firm military action was unanimous. Kissinger had received authority to convene the meeting and phoned the president at midnight. Haig relayed messages to him.

The president had fired Archibald Cox, and Elliot Richardson and William Ruckelshaus had resigned from the Justice Department the previous Saturday. Nixon was scheduled to discuss turning over the tapes to Judge Sirica and the shakeup at the Justice Department when the crisis postponed his television appearance. Kissinger was shocked and offended when reporters insinuated the president had staged the crisis to divert attention from Watergate. He called it "a symptom of what is happening in this country that it could even be suggested that the United States would alert its forces for domestic reasons." Later in the same press conference, Kissinger remarked the United States was "paying the price" for crises of authority.⁵² The Nixon news conference was delayed only two days, and it was unlikely the crisis had been staged for that reason. Hugh Scott, Edward Kennedy, Edmund Muskie, Clifford Case, Charles Percy and William Brock lent congressional approval to presidential actions in the

Middle East. Thomas O'Neill and Carl Albert defended the alert, and Senator Goldwater was "outraged" at the suggestion the event was staged, calling reporters who implied such a thing "hounds of destruction."⁵³ Haig described these several days at the White House as a "firestorm," keeping with the practice of the administration of putting military events in sports metaphors, and political events in military metaphors.

By 11:30 P.M. the NSC decided to call a Condition 3 alert. Kissinger told the press that he had ordered it, Schlesinger said that he had told Moorer to put it in effect, and the president claimed it was his decision. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., chief of Naval Operations and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has recalled that the military suspected Kissinger had not consulted with the president. Zumwalt reacted to the order by finding Senator Jackson to lobby for massive arms aid to Israel, believing Kissinger had held back.⁵⁴

According to some accounts, the secretary received intelligence reports the morning of October 24 that the Soviets had put three airborne divisions on high alert the preceding day, then four more on the 24th. Other studies claim the divisions had gone on alert October 10 and 18.⁵⁵ Two columnists have recently reported that the October 25 American alert responded to CIA information a ship carrying radioactive cargo, presumably nuclear warheads for the SCUD missiles, had docked in Alexandria the preceding day. The ship had actually been monitored as it passed through the Bosphorus October 22. The CIA reported to Kissinger at 7:30 A.M., October 25, that the vessel had docked.⁵⁶ This was six hours after the alert had gone into effect. Senior members of the Senate Armed Services Committee Stuart Symington and John Stennis said later they were unconvinced nuclear weapons had been brought to Egypt.⁵⁷ Kissinger told the press there was "no confirmed evidence" of nuclear weapons. He did not say there was no evidence. At the same time warheads were thought to enter Port Said, other were reported leaving Egypt. Nuclear warheads give off low levels of radiation, and are extremely difficult to identify at any distance. Their configuration resembles conventional warheads. Intelligence analysts did not consider it logical or likely the Soviets would ship nuclear weapons outside the USSR, especially to an area where Arab terrorists might seize them.⁵⁸ This may have been a psychological test of Washington, or simply the diversion of a ship routinely transferring nuclear weapons to Soviet vessels in the Mediterranean. If nuclear weapons were needed quickly or secretly, the Russians would have flown them to Egypt. Warheads would have protected Cairo and the 3rd Corps, but both warheads and an invasion were not required. In fact, large numbers of elite Soviet paratroops would have placed themselves in great danger entering a potential nuclear battlefield. The moves were badly coordinated or not coordinated at all. The Soviet ship left Port Said October 26, the second day of the alert.

Other intelligence pointed to an invasion. Soviet Antonov-12s resumed their airlift October 24. Approximately 40-50,000 airborne troops moved to staging areas (East Europe and the Ukraine) for flight to Egypt or Syria, and an invasion message was intercepted. If the Soviets had really intended to airlift troops, why was the alert in

two stages, first in the Ukraine, then East Europe and the USSR? The Soviets had only seven airborne divisions totaling 49,000 men, though some Defense Department officials believed at the time they had twelve or thirteen divisions. It is improbable they would have committed their entire force to the Middle East, and of course, had they intended to invade, they would not have sent a threat to Washington. For greatest effect, the alert of troops and dispatch of the Antonovs should have followed the Brezhnev note to Nixon. This would have created the impression that the Soviet Union had been forced to act, that the general secretary was prepared to back words with deeds, and so on. Airborne units could have seized or held positions, but they lacked the tactical mobility necessary for sustained desert warfare. Airborne units would have been outflanked and destroyed. On the other hand, fewer than 100 Antonov-12s could have transported motorized rifle or tank units capable of fighting a desert war.⁵⁹ In any case, it would have taken approximately a week to put a large Soviet force in the field under the wartime conditions of October 1973.⁶⁰

Kissinger later told the Kalbs that he had been “surprised as hell” to turn on the 7 A.M. news October 25 to hear the alert reported. The Kalbs reason he wanted to delay knowledge of the alert twenty-four hours in order to recall it if the Soviets cooperated.⁶¹ Secrecy was the Kissinger style. He was so secret, in fact, he did not inform Moscow of the alert, assuming it would pick up something on radar. NATO allies were told at 2 A.M., but communications broke down at Headquarters in Oslo, and commanders did not learn of the alert until Thursday noon, seven hours after it was called. The hotline went unused until late in the war when Kosygin was in Cairo.⁶² It had been in constant operation during the 1967 Six-Day War. Afterwards the secretary said Soviet moves were ambiguous and there had been no threats. President Nixon implied they were clear—the Soviets were prepared to invade, threats had been made.⁶³ The Kissinger strategy might have permitted Moscow to back off and to preserve detente; Nixon needed crisis, brinkmanship, toughness.

Schlesinger admitted to the press that one could more easily tell when the Soviets went on alert status than when they went off.⁶⁴ In other words, the United States had applied pressure, but could not readily tell whether it was working. Within two days, Schlesinger removed the Panama (11,000 troops) and Alaska (25,000 troops) Commands from the worldwide alert.

Kissinger held a televised news conference shortly after noon October 25. He warned of American determination to go to the brink: “We possess, each of us, nuclear arsenals capable of annihilating humanity. We, both of us, have a special duty to see to it that confrontations are kept within bounds that do not threaten civilized life. Both of us, sooner or later, will have to come to realize that the issues that divide the world today, and foreseeable issues, do not justify the unparalleled catastrophe that a nuclear war would represent.”⁶⁵ The message escalated the regional, conventional conflict to a bipolar, nuclear confrontation.

Prior to October 25 the United States had repeated it would not send troops to the Middle East—Kissinger and Schlesinger had said so October 20, Kissinger, Press

Secretary Gerald Warren and UN Ambassador John Scali had reaffirmed that position October 24. Moscow could assume Washington would not participate in any joint action. Despite the enormous domestic pressure to keep Americans out of this conflict after Vietnam, the administration should have promised every effort to keep armed personnel out, and left it at that. By October 27 Nixon had agreed to send unarmed technicians to supervise the cease-fire. Observers, said the administration, differed from peace-keeping forces. Within two weeks Kissinger was discussing international guarantees of Israeli borders. This presumably required Soviet-American action to deter or adjust violations. Having promised for days to keep American troops from the Middle East, virtually inviting Moscow to act alone, the secretary prepared to go to the brink if the Kremlin moved unilaterally. Two-thirds of the way through the press conference NBC decided to return to real life, and rejoined the game-show "Who, What, Where?"—in progress.

The administration belonged to that political wing which had condemned Secretary of State Dean Acheson for placing Korea outside the American defense perimeter during a news conference in January, 1950. This was six months before the invasion of South Korea. Kissinger may not have thought about this precedent, or may have thought American restraint would reassure the Soviets. In a way, it did. It reassured them they could act alone, and appear to save Egypt from an Israeli advance at practically no risk. As an alternative strategy, Kissinger could have accepted the joint force proposal, then requested an urgent meeting with Brezhnev to plan the joint intervention while Israel consolidated its gains. The Soviets must have reasoned whatever Washington did would undermine Tel Aviv. Washington could reject joint action and seem to abdicate its responsibilities, forcing Moscow to act, or appear to repudiate the Israelis by participating in a joint force. The United States also put itself in a situation where easing the alert depended on the cease-fire. Israel might have demanded arms and diplomatic support to win defensible positions before accepting the cease-fire. As it turned out, the assurance of arms from Washington had permitted the IDF to counter-attack across the Suez Canal October 15 and threaten to destroy the 3rd Corps. Kissinger had wanted to avert just that situation when the war began.⁶⁶ Though the secretary reiterated he wanted the powers to stay out of the Middle East, Soviet troops and technicians had been there for years. Even North Vietnamese and North Koreans were fighting in Syria.

Things were not going much more harmoniously for Moscow. The Egyptians denied the Soviets access to units preventing the evaluation of weapon effectiveness.⁶⁷ A Soviet barrier to Cairo or Damascus, a breakthrough to the 3rd Corps, or a paratroop operation in the Sinai were *not* Soviet *opportunities*. Algerian President Houari Boumediene had spent October 14-15 in Moscow during the crisis and reportedly urged Soviet military intervention. Talks were described as "friendly and frank"—the Soviets did not take to the idea.⁶⁸ Moscow removed hundreds of technicians and their dependents from Egypt and Syria just before the war. Had the Soviets run the operation, the technicians would have stayed.

If Moscow had wanted to send troops to Egypt, nothing was stopping them. The Kremlin had ninety-five ships in the Mediterranean. They remained off Turkey for the most part, away from hostilities. The attack-carrier *Kiev* was not ready for duty in 1973, but 6,000 Soviet marines were aboard ship in the Mediterranean. The United States had about sixty vessels, including three attack-carriers. Three Russian ships (a surface-to-surface missile boat, a surface-to-air missile ship, and a vessel for mid-course missile guidance) boxed in each American carrier. Four missile-firing submarines remained submerged nearby. The carriers put large numbers of planes into the air making it a standoff. Despite the drama, Soviet presence should not have inhibited mission fulfillment. In fact, the mission of the Navy seemed to have been to impress the Soviets with American power to prevent escalation, once it had attracted them into a confrontation. In the Indian Ocean the Soviet fleet amounted to thirty ships. An *Essex*-class carrier with five escort vessels was the total American force.⁶⁹ Had the Soviets landed troops by ship, even though transport by air would have been more likely and effective, American vessels might have fired on them or rammed some “by accident.” The probability of an amphibious assault or sea transport was low, and an American response even more remote. Six Soviet *Alligator* landing craft were in the eastern Mediterranean, but they could have accommodated a maximum of 1,800 troops.⁷⁰ Washington might have countered a Russian paratroop assault in the Sinai with a larger transfer of arms, with the use of jet fighters to support Israeli ground units, or as an extreme measure, with marine contingents. Short of a major engagement, Washington could only signal its resolve, a more realistic word might be its “interest.” The USSR had a negligible bomber force compared to the United States in 1973 (140 to 522 planes). SAC might fly around, but unless it were prepared for an enormous escalation from invasion to nuclear bombing, which Moscow might meet with tactical or strategic nuclear weapons for lack of a credible bomber force, the alert was futile as a deterrent. On the other hand, because the Soviets had no appropriate response to a nuclear alert, Kissinger considered it a safe gesture. It was just as he later cryptically called it—“a *deliberate* overreaction.”

This was not the first Soviet threat in the Middle East. During the Six-Day War, the USSR had worked in the Security Council for a cease-fire, which it accused Israel of disregarding. Israel agreed to implement the cease-fire June 10, the sixth day of the war. On that day Kosygin alerted the White House by hotline that a “very crucial moment” had come. Unless Israel halted, the USSR would take the “necessary actions, including military.” He warned of a “grave catastrophe.” After deliberation, President Johnson ordered the 6th Fleet to turn and come from 300 miles off Syria past the 100-mile limit to within 50 miles. Johnson recalled that the Soviet messages became more temperate, and the crisis subsided.⁷¹ The president assumed that Moscow intended to force a cease-fire, even though Israel had reached the Suez Canal and halted. He also believed that moving the Fleet near Syria, for some reason, kept airborne divisions out of Egypt. Moscow had similarly threatened to crush British and French aggressors during the 1956 Suez crisis. Premier Bulganin told the

French prime minister to think of France's dilemma confronted by states with modern and terrible weapons. By this November 5 warning the war was almost over. He threatened to send "volunteers" as late as November 10.⁷²

Conclusion

A political scientist has looked at crises and discerned cooperation among parties at the peaks of tension, while maneuvers for gains are greatest just before and after the most critical period of the confrontation. At the most tense moments, salient issues allow cooperation.⁷³ Soviet threats after a crisis has passed substantiate this hypothesis, but of course, one does not know until afterwards whether the maneuver follows the peak of tension or precedes it. The hypothesis suggests that Soviet warnings to send volunteers or to use nuclear weapons should be met with relief as signaling the easing of tensions. During the October War Moscow may simply have planned to repeat this pattern of post-crisis threats, but events seem more complex. In this instance, the Soviets recovered from the Egyptian initiative, and in an effort to do something, decided it was both sage and advantageous to threaten military intervention. The Israelis had halted and Washington had hesitated.

There are several general explanations for Kissinger's behavior October 24-25. The alert heightened the crisis to convince the Israelis to negotiate. Kissinger warned Premier Meir that she had to release the 3rd Corps to prevent Soviet intervention.⁷⁴ He told King Faisal the same thing November 8—that the oil embargo and Arab intransigence opened the way for Communism in the Middle East. The King replied that Zionism, not the Arabs, was advancing godless Communism.⁷⁵ The Kalbs think the alert got belligerents off dead center.⁷⁶ But aside from the cease-fire, in the interest of both parties, there was no place to move quickly. Some have seen events a matter of style. Joseph Kraft has written: "In sum, the Secretary's essential method is to leash the dogs of war which he himself has previously unleashed. It is not nice, but it works what looks like wonders."⁷⁷ Anthony Lewis saw events as melodramatic and similarly contrived by Kissinger. Foreign policy degenerated to "oversell, the personal dramas, the Hairbreath Harry escapes."⁷⁸ Kissinger might have used the alert to broaden American diplomatic options. He had written in 1957 that the threat to use nuclear weapons had to be real to be effective.⁷⁹ This was a chance to give credence to the nuclear deterrent with little risk. The alert introduced unpredictability into affairs. Kissinger had sent troops into Cambodia late in the war and may have thought the worldwide nuclear alert would similarly confuse the Kremlin, if not during the Yom Kippur War, then in future crises. The NSC seemed to believe Watergate required a show of strength and determination. Schlesinger had said firmness was imperative with the Russians, especially after the domestic presidential crisis. The secretary spoke about resolve in what sounded a very abstract sense: "I think it was important in view of the circumstances that have raised a question or may have raised a question about the ability of the United States to react appropriately, firmly and quickly, that this [the alert] cer-

tainly scotched whatever myths may have developed with regard to that possibility.”⁸⁰ Similar remarks by Haig and Kissinger suggest the October 24 NSC meeting did not establish any specific reason for the alert, or identify a Soviet threat. It was a desperate gesture to do something, but still a calculated gesture.

A journalist who has written extensively on the Middle East negotiations has credited Kissinger with managing the outcome of the Yom Kippur War: “The war ended in a deadlock—just as he had planned—with neither victor nor vanquished.”⁸¹ In a way, the 1956 and 1967 wars ended in a deadlock. The situation remained unresolved with no one completely victorious nor completely vanquished. Egypt believed the deadlock in 1973 left it stronger, making negotiations more difficult. The Israelis lost ground, money, arms, self-confidence, men and allies. By October 24 both Egypt and Israel wanted a cease-fire, and were prepared to negotiate the exchange of prisoners and, by November, border changes. Instead of bargaining with each other, both parties extracted the maximum from the United States as mediator. Tel Aviv was promised about \$5 billion in arms as well as American diplomatic and, possibly, military support. Cairo was offered a nuclear reactor, arms and economic assistance from Washington. It would subsequently also receive Soviet arms, including 50 reconditioned MiG-21s.⁸² Moscow benefited from the temporary Arab boycott and reduction in crude-oil production. The boycott permitted the USSR to sell petroleum at higher prices, including exports of \$40 million to the United States and \$135.6 million to the Netherlands.⁸³

The image of Kissinger managing events—another Metternich or Machiavelli—has, in this instance, concealed a man desperate to do something. Kissinger had assumed the Soviets would restrain the Arabs, and Washington had to help with the Israelis. But Moscow was not controlling events; it was nearly as surprised by developments as Washington. The alert was not a measure of the Soviet threat, and had no significant impact on Soviet actions. For the technical sophistication of weapons in 1973, there was no effective way to prevent a Soviet invasion. This incident contradicts the traditional force-counterforce paradigm that guides foreign policy. Events were more complex and uncontrolled. Force was misdirected and its results misperceived, but as superpowers, Washington and Moscow were compelled to act—in both senses of the word.

Notes

1. Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), pp. 479-99. Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1975), p. 206; Galia Golan, *Yom Kippur and After* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 126, 133, on the priority of the Soviet-American relationship.

2. Uri Ra'anana, “The USSR and the Middle East: Some Reflections on the Soviet Decision-Making Process,” *Orbis* 17, no. 3 (Fall 1973): 954-55.

3. William B. Quandt, “Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Disengagement Negotiations,” *Journal of International Affairs* 29, no. 1 (Spring 1975): 34.

4. Edward R. F. Sheehan, *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger* (New York: Reader's Digest/Thomas Y. Crowell, 1976), p. 78.

5. Sheehan writes about Kissinger's successful bargaining in the Middle East despite his inexperience there:

In that contest, each party must know what it wants and approximately what it is prepared to pay; moreover, it must know that the other side knows also. But in the midst of bargaining there must develop as well a personal bond between buyer and seller—a covenant of confidence and trust that excites the sentiment of friendship. (As we have observed, in his previous dealings with the Arabs, Dr. Kissinger already had displayed some working knowledge of these principles. He was, after all, a Semite.)

6. Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, p. 28, on the alert of the Corps which led the attack across the Canal. William B. Quandt, "Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War" (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., R-1864-ISA, 1976), p. 12, and Chapman Pincher, London *Daily Express*, 9 October 1973, on the withdrawal. Quandt rejects and Pincher accepts the idea. Sadat said he informed the Soviets of an attack October 3 without naming the date, and Assad told them October 4. Heikal commented the Soviets were told October 1. Golan, *Yom Kippur and After*, pp. 66, 69. Walter Laqueur, *Confrontation. The Middle East and World Politics* (New York: Quadrangle, 1974), pp. 189-90 errs in saying the USSR launched nine satellites October 3. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Soviet Space Programs, 1971-75*, 1976, 1: 596.

7. Edward R. F. Sheehan, "How Kissinger Did It. Step By Step in the Middle East," *Foreign Policy* 22 (Spring 1976): 9-10.

8. Major-General (Reserve) Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement, October 1973* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975), pp. 52-54. Lt.-Gen. (Res.) Haim Bar Lev has said, "The surprise by which Israel was caught was full, at all levels—the strategic, operational and tactical. As a result, Israel had to wage a war which was improvised and confused in everything. Not a single operational plan was carried out as planned in advance: not the containment plan nor the use of the air force in a blocking action, not the counter-attack nor the crossing of the Canal." *Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict* (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1975), pp. 264-65. Lawrence L. Whetten, *The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), pp. 240-43, discusses other signals of an invasion.

9. Ray S. Cline, "Policy Without Intelligence," *Foreign Policy* 17 (Winter 1974-75): 131-34. Cline was head of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1969-73. He was said to have decided October 5, 1973, that war would break out the following day or sooner. Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, "Twenty Days in October," *New York Times Magazine*, 23 June 1974, p. 8. Quandt recalls Kissinger ordered CIA and Bureau of Intelligence and Research reports on the likelihood of war in late September. *Decade of Decisions. American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967-76* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 167. State Department analysts estimated May 31 that chances of a Middle East war by fall were "better than even" if no credible political initiative toward settlement were made. Excerpts from the report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence concerning this carefully hedged prediction appear in *The Village Voice*, 16 February 1976, pp. 78-79.

10. Nixon-Frost Interview No. 2, 12 May 1977.

11. Aside from the Kalb and Sheehan studies, standard biographies include Ralph Blumenfeld, *Henry Kissinger. The Private and Public Story* (New York: New American Library, 1974); Stephan Graubard, *Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind* (New York: Norton, 1973); David Landau, *Kissinger: The Uses of Power* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), Metternich and Castlereagh, pp. 26-27; John G. Stoessinger, *Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power* (New York: Norton, 1976); Garry Wills, "Kissinger—Personality," *Playboy* 21 (December, 1974), Metternich, pp. 282, 291-92, Machiavelli, p. 284; Sheehan, *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger*, Talleyrand, p. 48; Oriana Fallaci, *Interview with History* (New York: Liveright, 1976), Metternich, p. 27. Bruce Mazlish, *Kissinger. The European Mind in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), speaks about the limiting spirit of one (Metternich) and the will of the other (Bismarck) as a model for Kissinger. This historical model supports the theme of "acceptance and transcendence" in Kissinger's life and thought; pp. 182, 220. Also Thomas L. Hughes, "The Bismarck Connection: Why Kissinger Must Choose between Nixon and the Country," *New York Times Magazine*, 30 December 1973, pp. 8-9, 27-28, 31. The famous Lonesome Cowboy interview with Oriana Fallaci was no slip of the tongue that revealed the Kissinger psychology. He probably had the image ready for Fallaci, expected it to be popular and useful for himself. She asked if he had a theory about his popu-

larity: "Yes, but I won't tell you. . . I repeat, I won't tell you. . . The main point arises from the fact that I've always acted alone. Americans like the cowboy who leads the wagon train by riding ahead alone into the town, the village, with his horse and nothing else. Maybe even without a pistol, since he doesn't shoot. He acts, that's all, by being in the right place at the right time. In short, a Western." *Interview with History*, pp. 40-41. Kissinger could not control the image, and for the admiration he expected, he found ridicule: "out galloped Hoot Gibson." Wills, "Kissinger—Personality," p. 122.

12. Edward N. Luttwak and Walter Laqueur, "Kissinger and the Yom Kippur War," *Commentary* 58, no. 3 (September 1974): 33-40.
13. Sheehan, *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger*, p. 33.
14. *New York Times*, 10 October 1973, p. 1.
15. Golan, *Yom Kippur and After*, p. 87.
16. Luttwak and Laqueur, "Kissinger and the Yom Kippur War," p. 35.
17. Government Accounting Office, *Airlift Operations of the Military Airlift Command During the 1973 Middle East War* 8 (16 April 1975): 12-13.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
19. Jac Weller, "Tanks in the Middle East," *Military Review* 56, no. 5 (May 1976): 17-19. Of course, geography constrained the Syrian front. The ratio of Israeli dead to Arab tank losses was nearly the same as in 1956 and 1967. The Israelis lost 2,400 men, and the Arabs lost 2,300 tanks. Kenneth S. Brower, "The Yom Kippur War," *Military Review* 54, no. 3 (March 1974): 25, 33. Whetten discusses military aspects of the war in *The Canal War*, pp. 243-84.
20. Graham H. Turbiville, "Soviet Desert Operations," *Military Review* 54, no. 6 (June 1974): 48.
21. *Aviation Week and Space Technology* 99, no. 25 (17 December 1973): 17.
22. U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, *Congressional Record* 119, no. 31 (11 December 1973): 40820.
23. *New York Times*, 9 October 1973, p. 1; 10 October 1973, p. 1; 13 October 1973, p. 15.
24. Ronald M. DeVore, "The Arab-Israeli Arms Race and the Superpowers," *Current History* 66 (February 1974): 71.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-73; Roger F. Pajak, "Soviet Arms and Egypt," *Survival* (July-August 1975), pp. 165-73; U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Report of the Special Subcommittee on the Middle East*, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975, p. 5. Soviets apparently flew MiG-25s for reconnaissance. *New York Times*, 24 October 1973, p. 19. Sadat complained he had received no satellite battlefield intelligence from the Soviets. *Time*, 20 March 1978, p. 42. On October 18, 1973, Kosygin brought an expert on aerial photography to a meeting in Cairo to show Sadat no fewer than 270 Israeli tanks and armored vehicles had crossed the Canal to the West Bank. Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, pp. 235, 246.
26. U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, *Congressional Record* 119, no. 31 (11 December 1973): 40825.
27. *New York Times*, 24 October 1973, p. 18; *Washington Post*, 27 October 1973, p. A4. Quandt provides charts of the Soviet airlift to the Middle East, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the date of the transit of cargo through the Bosphorus in "Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War," pp. 23, 25-26, but he gives no source. His charts show little change in tonnage to Egypt between October 20 and 22, but a substantial drop October 23.
28. Ray Bonds, ed., *The Soviet War Machine* (New York: Chartwell, 1976), p. 50.
29. Sheehan, *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger*, p. 232.
30. Oles M. Smolansky, *The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Krushchev* (Lewisburg, Ky.: Bucknell University Press, 1974), p. 303.
31. Gur Ofer, "Soviet Military Aid to the Middle East—An Economic Balance Sheet," in U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1976, p. 219; especially arms to Libya, Iraq, and Iran, p. 237.
32. U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *The Posture of Military Airlift*, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975, pp. 30-31.
33. Quandt, "Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War," p. 23.
34. *New York Times*, 10 October 1973, p. 33. Between October, 1973, and January, 1974, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised oil prices by 400 percent. The

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence stated that public sources of information (*Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, *London Financial Times*, and the *Wall Street Journal*) reported more consistently than American intelligence services about the changing policy of the Saudis between April and August, 1973. These sources also concluded that after the October War, oil prices would remain at new high levels, while intelligence agencies anticipated a fall in prices. The Committee found fixed views dominated analysis of information by the government. Prices were considered in a supply-and-demand context without reference to political factors. The CIA disagreed with the study's conclusion that public sources provided better analysis. Many CIA estimates did not anticipate the October War, and assumed that in the absence of conflict, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states would not use oil as a political weapon. U.S., Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, unclassified summary of "U.S. Intelligence Analysis on the Oil Issue, 1973-1974," released 20 December 1977, pp. 2, 4, 8, 12.

35. State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey referred to a declaration by EEC nations early in the war as "boneless." *New York Times*, 27 October 1973, p. 1.

36. *Economist*, 3 November 1973, p. 13.

37. Matti Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger* (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), p. 84.

38. *Yediot Aharonot* (Israel), 15 February 1974, in Sheehan, *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger*, p. 231.

39. Quoted by Winston Churchill, M.P. in the *Jerusalem Post*, 16 December 1973.

40. Nixon-Frost Interview No. 2, 12 May 1977.

41. Laqueur, *Confrontation*, p. 196. Sadat claimed he decided on a cease-fire October 19 after massive American military aid to Israel. *Time*, 20 March 1978, p. 42.

42. Sheehan describes Assad as politically shrewd, with "Alawite cunning." *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger*, pp. 93, 128.

43. Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger*, p. 88.

44. China did not stage any mass protests and media devoted little coverage to the war in contrast to events in 1967. Lillian Craig Harris, "Chinese Politics in the Middle East," *Current History* 74 (January 1978): 36. Col. Martin J. Slominski, "The Soviet Military Press and the October War," *Military Review* 54, no. 5 (May 1974): 39-47, reviews coverage in *Krasnaia Zvezda*.

45. The times are those found in the Kalbs' *Kissinger*, pp. 489-91, which relies heavily on interviews with the secretary. Different times appear in the *Sunday Times* (London), *Insight on the Middle East War* (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1974), pp. 205-09. Newspapers reported that the alert went into effect at 2:30 A.M., and President Nixon formally authorized it at 3:00 A.M.

46. Kalbs, *Kissinger*, p. 490.

47. *New York Times*, 26 October 1973, p. 20.

48. The Department of State continues to believe disclosure of this four-paragraph note "could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security." U.S., Department of State, Freedom of Information Act Case No. 740-320 and 740-541, 6 February 1978. There was no Russian text, and the note was located in the Kissinger Papers held by State instead of in the cable files of the department. The most critical letter of the Cuban missile crisis from Krushchev to Kennedy, October 26, 1962, remained classified "Confidential" and unpublished until 1973, when it appeared in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., *The Dynamics of World Power*, 5 vols. (New York: Chelsea House, 1973), 2: 698-703, and in the *Department of State Bulletin* 59, no. 1795 (19 November 1973): 640-45.

49. *New York Times*, 16 October 1973, p. 14.

50. Charles W. Yost, "The Arab-Israeli War. How it Began," *Foreign Affairs* 46, no. 2 (January 1968): 315-20, on Nasser's goals of Arab unity and personal recognition.

51. I. F. Stone, "Where Was Nixon When Sadat Gave the Russians the Boot?" *New York Review of Books* 19 (31 August 1972): 10.

52. *Washington Post*, 26 October 1973, p. A9.

53. *Washington Post*, 26 October 1973, p. A10.
54. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., *On Watch* (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), p. 435.
55. Laqueur, *Confrontation*, p. 204; Kalbs, "Twenty Days in October," p. 50.
56. Jack Cloherty and Bob Owens, AP report, *Minneapolis Tribune*, 15 March 1977, p. 12A; Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, p. 198; Kalbs, *Kissinger*, p. 493.
57. *New York Times*, 22 November 1973, p. 1.
58. *New York Times*, 22 November 1973, p. 19.
59. Turbiville, "Soviet Desert Operations," pp. 49-50. The M1970 light tank was introduced in airborne units in November 1973 to deal with this problem.
60. Golan, *Yom Kippur and After*, p. 122.
61. Kalbs, *Kissinger*, p. 488.
62. Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, p. 246.
63. *New York Times*, 26 October 1973, pp. 1, 18-20; 27 October 1973, p. 14.
64. *New York Times*, 27 October 1973, p. 10.
65. *New York Times*, 26 October 1973, p. 18.
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